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Challenges 
• Defense acquisition is already broken 
– Systems Engineering – event driven vs effects based 
– Reduced Capacity – “procurement holidays” increase cycle 
time and costs 
– Complexity – A&D community self inflicted wound 
– Requirements – not necessarily connected to mission, physical 
reality, affordability, and ability to deliver on time 
• Reduced budgets are a fact of life  
– Fewer acquisition new starts 
– Reduced infrastructure, reduced capacity 
– Not if or when, but how much 
• Over the next decade the US could loose technological 
superiority, economic competitiveness in key areas 
• We have to get past policies to systemic root causes to overcome 
pending reductions and increase the output of the US Aerospace 
and Defense industry   
Key  Systems Engineering Leverage Points  
Marked by Events – Mired by Lack of Effectiveness 
2.Technology 
Maturity  
   @ MS B 
3. Design Closure @ CDR 
4. Late Defects 
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Top Line Economic Model 
Understanding Impact of Reduced Capacity 





























Final number of systems actually 
delivered driven by: 
•Overruns 
•Congressional or DoD dictates 
•Final Budget constraints 
Fraction of Systems 
Actually Delivered 
RDT&E Budget fraction amplifies 
the RDT&E and Procurement 







- + Delta Budget 
Budget + 
Budget - 
RDT&E Fraction of the DoD  
Acquisition Budget 
Is The Next Wave 
Starting to Break? 
Macro-Dynamics of Acquisition 
Moving From Symptoms to Systemic Causes 





• Discrete jumps in RDT&E Fraction align with 
“Procurement Holidays” – not a general increase 
attributable to complexity 
 
• Fundamental dynamic cycle –  
• At onset of each period, procurement decreases but 
RDT&E stays constant because of backlog 
• At end of each period, procurement increases and so 
does RDT&E because of new starts added to backlog 
 
• Correlating causative factor – 
• Capability and capacity of system reduced at 
beginning of each cycle but not rebuilt during the 
ascending end of the cycle – bathtub effect, more 
RDT&E coming in but less going out 
Acquisition system has passed a tipping point 
leading to pathological firefighting 
Doesn’t Matter Which Way the 
 Budget is Headed 
• Declining Acquisition Budget 
– Reduced capacity, capability, intellectual capital 
– Programs already in development continue with 
less capacity for development 
• Increasing Acquisition Budget 
– Increase in new starts added to programs 
already in development  
– Capacity, capability, and intellectual capital not 
increased to meet new demand 
 
 Both scenarios lead to a mismatch between 
capacity and demand leading to pathological 
firefighting for all programs 
Simple Dynamic Model 
Effect of Reduced RDT&E Capacity 
•Simple sinusoidal Proc $ 
with 20 yr period , 
$90B±$30B 
•Baseline RDT&E $ 
expended at 0.25 Acq $ 
•With perfectly balanced, 
infinitely elastic capacity 
RDT&E $ would stay at 
0.25 Acquisition $ 
 •Reduced capacity consistent 
with previous chart 
•-15% in 70’s,  
•constant in 80’s @ 85%,  
•further reduced  25%in 90’s  
•constant in 00’s  @ 60% 
•Replicates major trends, Total 
RDT&E $ and RDT&E Fraction 
escalate after each cycle 
 
Complexity 
A Self Inflicted Wound? 
Runaway cycle time not 




•Lack of Accountability 
Aerospace industry rampant with 
late defects and rework 
•Design tools and processes 
•Lack of feedback to key design 
and SE processes 
•Lack of quantified risk and 














Average Time to IOC 
Next Gen 
 Fighter? 
Complex Systems + Reduced Capacity/Capability            Long Development Cycle 
Requirements Setting 
Robust, Resilient Design Vice Single Point Optimum Solution 
























Margin and Uncertainties 
of Dominant Solutions Can 
Create Large Increases in 
Life Cycle Cost 






Tools for Rapid 
Exploration  of the 
Physical Design 
Space 
Coupling Operability, Interoperability, and Physical 
Feasibility Analyses – a Game Changer 
Operational Modeling 
•  Discrete Event Simulation, 
Agent Based Modeling 
• < Real Time 
• Scenario Visualization 
• Event Engineering Models 
• Table Look Ups 
Physics Modeling 
•Discretized Physics 




•Discrete Event Simulation 
•Real Time 
•High Resolution Time –Space 
Visualization 
•Event Engineering Models 
•Table Look Ups 
Comm Models 
Common Interface 
Built on Reducing 
Physics Models to 
Light Weight Algebraic 
Relations 
L-V-C Interface 
Integrating M&S, RDT&E, and Statistical 




Quantified Margins and 




A Continuum of Tools Underpinned with Statistical Engineering  

























Sustained  System Model Across LC 
Helios 
Early Decisions for Better Outcomes 
Better Tools and Processes Applied Earlier 
•Systems Engineering – event driven vs effects based 
•Quantified margins/uncertainties at key decision points, particularly MS A/B 
•Accountability for risk management  
•Reduced Capacity – “procurement holidays” increase cycle time 
• Increase effective capacity by reducing total workload and late defect 
discoveries through better design tools and  technical process changes 
•Complexity – aerospace/defense community self inflicted wound 
•Platform based engineering, common architectures for most software systems 
vice clean sheet approach 
• Increases in complexity have to “buy” their way onto the system during the 
requirements setting phase, including impact on acquisition cycle time 
•Requirements – not necessarily connected to mission or physical 
reality 
• Integrated wargames, flight simulators, and physics-based modeling support 
early insertion of physical reality into operational assessments and cost/risk 
projections 
•Resilient system designs for flexibility to meet changing missions 
 

